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Abstract
The central question of this paper is how international trade and special-
ization are affected by different designs of pension schemes and asymmet-
ric demographic changes. In a model with two goods, two countries and
two production factors, we find that countries with a relatively large un-
funded pension scheme will specialize in the production of labour intensive
goods. If these countries are hit by a negative demographic shock, this
specialization will intensify in the long run. Eventually, these countries
may even completely specialize in the production of those goods. The
effects spill over to other countries, which will move away from complete
specialization in capital intensive goods as the relative size of their labour
intensive goods sector will also increase.
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1 Introduction
In the next decades, the demographic composition in large parts of the world will
change, due to population ageing, migration etc. This will lead to changes in the
size of the (potential) labour force, for which the number of people aged between
20 and 64 is a good indication. As Figure 1 shows, the differences between
countries and regions are pronounced. While the number is steadily rising in
the United States (19% between 2015 and 2100), it decreases in Japan (by 46%)
and Europe (29%). Within Europe, especially the eastern and southern part
will experience a substantial drop.1 The development for China is shown in
Figure 2, indicating that also there the size of the labour force is expected to
decrease substantially (by about 48% in 2100).
Table 1 is derived from these figures and shows the relative sizes. For in-
stance, in 2015, the number of people aged 20-64 is 2.7 times higher in the
United States compared to Japan. By 2100, this ratio is expected to have risen
to almost 6. In other words, the United States’ “young” population will have
grown by a factor 2.2 compared to that of Japan.
Table 1: Relative number of people aged 20-64
2015 2030 2045 2060 2075 2100
USA/Japan 2.7 3.1 3.9 4.6 5.2 5.9
China/USA 4.8 4.5 3.7 2.9 2.6 2.1
Europe/USA 2.4 2.1 1.8 1.6 1.6 1.4
Eastern Europe/Western Europe 1.7 1.5 1.5 1.3 1.3 1.2
Northern and Western Europe/
1.9 2.0 2.3 2.4 2.6 2.8
Southern Europe
Source: United Nations World Population Prospects: the 2015 Revision
(medium variant)
The numbers clearly show that substantive changes are expected in the rel-
ative size of the (potential) labour force in different parts of the world. Un-
doubtedly, this will put pension systems under pressure, but will also affect
1Northern Europe includes Denmark, Estonia, Faeroe Islands, Finland, Iceland, Ireland,
Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Eastern Europe consists of
Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Slovakia,
Ukraine. Southern Europe includes Albania, Andorra, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia,
Greece, Italy, Malta, Montenegro, Portugal, San Marino, Serbia, Slovenia, Spain and TFYR
Macedonia. Western Europe consists of Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Liechtenstein,
Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands and Switzerland.
2
Figure 1: Population aged 20-64 (thousands)
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Figure 2: Population aged 20-64 in China (thousands)
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the endowments of capital and labour, and therefore have important macroeco-
nomic consequences that may spill over to other countries and regions through
international trade, specialization and real exchange rate changes.
According to the classical Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) model (Samuel-
son (1948)), a country will specialize in the production of the good that uses
its relatively abundant production factor. This would imply, as stated in the
Rybczynski theorem (Rybczynsky (1955)) and demonstrated by e.g. Findlay
(1970), that a country which experiences a relatively shrinking labour force will
specialize in the production of capital intensive goods, and will trade with coun-
tries that are endowed with a relatively small capital stock. In these models, the
amounts of labour and capital in each country are exogenously given and inter-
nationally immobile. This sounds reasonable for analysing the short-run effects
of demographic shocks, but this assumption is not appropriate when studying
the long-run effects. In the course of time, the amount of capital in an economy
will adjust to its new population level. So in the long run specialization also
depends on factors that determine people’s desire and ability to save and accu-
mulate capital, such as individual thriftiness and institutional arrangements like
pension schemes. The research question of this paper therefore is how special-
ization and international trade are affected by asymmetric demographic changes
when countries have different designs of their pension schemes.
Our paper adds to the previous literature in two ways. First, it focuses on
the pension system as another important element for international differences
in savings, and thereby for specialization and trade. Second, it studies the
short-run and long-run effects of demographic developments when differences in
pension systems are taken into account. Factor rewards and the real exchange
rate are endogenously determined.
To analyse this, we develop a 2 overlapping-generations model with 2 coun-
tries and 2 goods/sectors: a consumption good and an investment good. The
production of consumption goods is more labour intensive than the production
of investment goods. Savings can only be invested in investment goods, which
add to the capital stock one period later. The countries, which can trade these
goods with each other, differ in two respects: they have a different size of their
unfunded pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension scheme and a different demographic
development. In particular, one country experiences a temporary drop in the
rate of population growth.
We find that in the long run, the relative size of the two production sectors
– and therefore the pattern of trade – depends on the generosity of the PAYG
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schemes: the larger such a scheme is compared to that of another country,
the less capital it will accumulate and the more it will specialize in the labour
intensive consumption goods, which it will export. In the steady state, the
distribution of labour between the two sectors not only depends on the size
of the PAYG scheme, but also on the relative size of both countries in terms
of population. As a consequence, temporary demographic shocks that alter
the relative size of both countries may have permanent effects, also for the
country that is not experiencing the shock. However, this is only the case if
the size of the PAYG scheme in both countries is different. If the country with
the larger PAYG pension scheme is confronted with a relative decrease in its
population size, this may lead to a larger share of the labour force working in
the labour intensive goods sector. The intuition for this result is the following:
the country with the relatively large pension scheme has smaller savings per
capita and, as a result, specializes in labour-intensive goods. A shrinkage of
its population makes labour-intensive goods relatively scarce in the two-country
world. As a result, after the negative demographic shock hits, this country
increases its specialization in labour-intensive goods. This effect also spillovers
to the neighbouring country.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: The next section discusses
some related literature. Section 3 describes the model, and Section 4 presents
the steady state and elaborates on the effect of the size of the PAYG schemes
in the countries on the sector structure of the economies. In Section 5 we
analyse the effects of a temporary decrease in fertility in the Home country.
First, analytical long-run results are derived, then the short-run dynamics is
illustrated using numerical simulation experiments. Section 6 concludes and
discusses possible extensions of the model.
2 Related literature
So far, the dynamic trade literature can basically be divided in studies that focus
on different saving rates and specialization, studies that focus on different de-
mographic developments and specialization, and studies that combine both, but
do not consider different kinds of commodities (so specialization is neglected).
Previous studies on multiple goods and trade have already emphasised in-
ternational differences in saving rates as an important factor for trade flows and
patterns of specialization, dating back to the seminal article by Oniki and Uzawa
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(1965) in which countries have fixed, but different saving rates. Findlay (1970)
also applies exogenous saving rates and finds that a higher saving rate is associ-
ated with a higher relative output of the capital intensive good. In Stiglitz (1970)
and Deardorff and Hansson (1978), saving rates were endogenised by assuming
infinitely-lived consumers whose rates of time preference differ between coun-
tries, leading to high-saving countries exporting capital intensive goods. Later
extensions of such Ramsey-type trade models focus on relative factor intensi-
ties (Engel and Kletzer (1989)), taxation of capital goods (Baxter (1992)), and
terms-of-trade effects that influence incentives to save and convergence (Bajona
and Kehoe (2010)). In another strand of literature, the overlapping-generations
framework is applied, which allows for analysing intergenerational issues, such
as in Fried (1980) who finds that transfers between generations are required
for a production innovation to be welfare improving. Internationally different
saving rates play an important role when analysing the short-run and long-run
welfare effects of free trade and capital flows (Buiter (1981), Serra (1991), Fisher
(1992), Kemp and Wong (1995), Gokcekus and Tower (1998)) and also in the
paper by Galor and Polemarchakis (1987) on transfers between countries, which
shows that such transfers will decrease welfare in the recipient country if the
marginal propensity to save in this country is lower than in the donor country. A
similar conclusion was drawn by Mountford (1998), where trade may move the
world toward a low-income steady state. Frenkel and Razin (1996) provide an
overview in open-economy macroeconomics, including a two-period, two-good
model to study saving behaviour and current account dynamics after shocks in
the terms of trade.
Some recent papers focus on demographic factors and trade. Kenc and
Sayan (2001) apply an OLG computable general-equilibrium model to analyse
the effects of population ageing in the EU on Turkey’s key macroeconomic vari-
ables with international trade as a transmission mechanism. They find that
demographic developments in Europe magnify the economic effects of ageing in
Turkey considerably. Sayan (2005) analyses the effects of demographic changes
on the pattern of losses and gains from trade in a ‘2x2x2’ HOS model where
countries are identical except for the rate of population growth. As a lower
population growth rate in autarky would imply a higher capital-labour ratio
(due to less capital dilution), this leads to trade with the ageing country that is
specializing in capital intensive goods. However, this trade does not necessarily
lead to welfare gains for both countries. Naito and Zhao (2009) refine this re-
sult and also conclude that an ageing country will export the capital intensive
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good. The old generation in the ageing country gains from trade, but subse-
quent generations lose during the transition phase. A compensation scheme
consisting of country-specific lump-sum taxes (transfers) and saving subsidies
(taxes) can make free trade Pareto superior to autarky. This paper is extended
by Yakita (2012) with endogenous fertility and human capital, which finds that
ageing, modeled as an increase in life expectancy, does not necessarily make the
country a net exporter of capital intensive goods.
The combination of international differences in savings/pension schemes and
population growth rates have been analysed with one-good models. For in-
stance, Bo¨rsch-Supan et al. (2006) study the consequences of asymmetric pop-
ulation ageing in five regions of the world using a multi-generations simulation
model. In most scenarios in this model, ageing countries export capital in the
short run, and start importing capital later. Adema et al. (2008) study the
spillover effects of pension schemes under symmetric population ageing in a
two-country two-OLG model with perfect capital mobility, and show that a
country with a PAYG pension scheme gains from the country with a funded
pension scheme, because it generates larger savings. Ito and Tabata (2010)
also study international spillover effects through cross-border capital flows, but
model ageing as an increase in longevity.
The main difference between these studies and our paper is that we allow for
two different goods, which enables us to study the effects of a demographic shock
on the relative size of sectors in the countries, specialization, the characteristics
of international trade flows and the real-exchange rate. To the best of our
knowledge, this not been analysed before in the dynamic trade literature, with
the exception of Matsuyama (1988) who analyses the long-run effects of a higher
population growth rate. If the country’s citizens are relatively patient compared
to the rest of the world, this country will export capital intensive goods, but
higher population growth will lead to exports of labour intensive goods in the
long run. This, however, concerns a small open economy with fixed wages and
interest rate.
3 The model
The model describes a discrete time two-country two-sector economic union
where both countries have the same sectors. So, goods produced in different
countries but the same sectors are identical. We assume that one sector (indi-
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cated with index C) produces goods used for consumption and the other sector
(index I) produces goods that can only be used for investment. Both countries
are identical with respect to the production structure and household preferences,
but they may differ with respect to the size of the PAYG pension scheme. To
distinguish between the countries one country will be referred to as “Home coun-
try” (H), the other being the “Foreign country” (F). We use the same notation
for the variables in the Home country and the Foreign country, but variables
referring to the latter are indicated by a tilde (∼).
There are two overlapping generations in the model: young and old, and
there is no population growth except for one period of temporal change in the
fertility rate in one of the countries. Each person lives for two periods. The
total number of young in the Home country is indicated by Λ. These young
agents inelastically supply one unit of labour. We denote the number of young
in the Home country working in the investment good sector in period t by
LI(t), so labour market clearing implies LC(t) = Λ(t)− LI(t) persons working
in the consumption good sector. Production factors are not internationally
mobile. That is, agents cannot migrate and they can only invest in their Home
country. However, both investment goods and consumption goods can be traded
on the international market. In fact, the presence of international trade equalises
interest rates in the countries, and a possibility of capital mobility becomes
redundant. This property is discussed in detail by Mundell (1957) and Razin
and Sadka (1992).
We suppose that in the initial period the countries are identical apart from
the pension schemes. However, as it will be explained later, differences in pen-
sion schemes, do cause other differences between the countries, such as savings
rates and their specializations.
3.1 Firms
The firms in both countries are identical; therefore, we only present the equa-
tions for the Home country. In both sectors production at time t is described
by a standard Cobb-Douglas function with constant returns to scale:
YC(t) = KC(t)
αLC(t)
1−α, (1)
YI(t) = KI(t)
βLI(t)
1−β , 0 < α < β < 1, (2)
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where KC(t) and KI(t) denote the capital stock in the consumption good sector
and the investment good sector, respectively. We assume that production in the
investment good sector is more capital intensive than in the consumption good
sector (i.e., β > α).
Capital fully depreciates in one period. In both sectors, the returns to the
production factors are equal to their marginal products. Both interest rates and
wages are expressed in terms of consumption goods, and the interest rates are
defined as returns to investment measured in consumption goods:
wC(t) = (1− α)kC(t)α (3)
wI(t) = (1− β)p(t)kI(t)β (4)
1 + rC(t) =
α
p(t− 1)kC(t)
α−1 (5)
1 + rI(t) =
βp(t)
p(t− 1)kI(t)
β−1 (6)
where wC(t) is the wage rate in the consumption good sector, wI(t) denotes
the wage in the investment good sector, rC(t) and rI(t) are the interest rates
in consumption and investment good sector. p(t) is the price of investment
goods in terms of consumption goods at time t and kC(t) ≡ KC(t)/LC(t) and
kI(t) ≡ KI(t)/LI(t) denote the capital-labour ratio in sector C and sector I,
respectively.
3.2 Factor mobility between sectors
Agents can freely choose in which sector to work when young. After they have
chosen a sector, this cannot be changed any more. As a result, expected lifetime
utility at the start of the career should be equal for workers in both sectors.2
The assumption that labour and capital cannot change their location after they
are employed in a particular sector does not affect long run results. Regard-
ing the short run results, under such an assumption, structural changes in the
economy will have heterogeneous effects on the agents working in different sec-
tors. However, as will be discussed in the next section, they are pretty similar,
implying that qualitative as well as quantitative results do not depend on this
2The equations in this section are based on the assumption of rational expectations. There-
fore, they may not hold in a period in which a shock takes place after the agents have decided
in which sector to work and to invest. In the numerical simulations in Section 4, the actual
return to savings in the period of the demographic shock is calculated using the assumption
that all the agents have the same portfolio.
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assumption much.
A larger budget allows an agent to reach a higher indifference curve; there-
fore, this implies equality of expected present values of individual incomes. As
the pension system is organised on a national level and is identical for workers
in both sectors, this boils down to equality of the wages in the sectors:3
wC(t) = wI(t) ≡ w(t). (7)
Likewise, agents may freely choose in which sector to invest their savings, im-
plying that interest rates in both sectors are equal as well:
rC(t) = rI(t) ≡ r(t). (8)
Using equations (3)-(8), we can express the capital-labour ratio in the sectors
as a function of the relative price of investment goods:
kC(t) =
(
1− α
1− β
) 1−β
β−α
(
α
β
) β
β−α
p(t)−
1
β−α , (9)
kI(t) =
(
1− α
1− β
) 1−α
β−α
(
α
β
) α
β−α
p(t)−
1
β−α . (10)
Note that these equations also hold for the Foreign country. That is, the capital-
labour ratios in a particular sector are equal in both countries, resulting in
equality of factor prices. This is in line with the classical Heckscher-Ohlin-
Samuelson model. It also follows that the capital-labour ratios in both sectors
are proportional to each other, i.e.:
kC(t) = κkI(t) (11)
where 0 < κ ≡ (1−β)α(1−α)β < 1, so kI(t) > kC(t).
3.3 Households
Because of the free mobility of production factors between sectors, we do not
have to distinguish between households working in both sectors (except for
the time of a population shock). Utility functions and budget constraints are
3Since the same holds for both countries, we again only give the equations for the Home
country. It should be noted, however, that the pension schemes are organised on a national
level and PAYG tax and benefit levels in the countries may differ.
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assumed to be identical in both countries, so again we only present the equations
for the Home country.
Agents are assumed to have a logarithmic utility function:
U(t) = logCy(t) +
1
1 + ρ
logCo(t+ 1), (12)
where Cy and Co denote consumption when young and when old, respectively,
and ρ is the rate of time preference. The budget constraints for the first and
the second period of life are given by:
Cy(t) = w(t)(1− τ)− s(t), (13)
Co(t+ 1) =
(
1 + r(t+ 1)
)
s(t) + x(t+ 1), (14)
where s stands for savings, τ is the tax rate on labour income to finance the
PAYG pension scheme, and x is the pension benefit. The pension system is
organised on a national level and is identical for workers in both sectors. Because
the PAYG tax is fixed, the pension benefit adjusts to e.g. demographic changes
according to the following balanced-budget constraint for the government:
x(t+ 1) = τ
w(t+ 1)Λ(t+ 1)
Λ(t)
. (15)
Optimising the utility function (12) subject to the budget constraints (13)
and (14) results in the following expression for savings:
s(t) =
1
2 + ρ
(
w(t)(1− τ)− 1 + ρ
1 + r(t+ 1)
x(t+ 1)
)
. (16)
3.4 Equilibrium
The model comprises four markets that are simultaneously in equilibrium each
period. Equilibrium in the markets for consumption and investment goods im-
plies:
YC(t) + Y˜C(t) = Λ(t)C
y(t) + Λ(t− 1)Co(t) + Λ˜(t)C˜y(t) + Λ˜(t− 1)C˜o(t) (17)
YI(t− 1) + Y˜I(t− 1) = KC(t) +KI(t) + K˜C(t) + K˜I(t). (18)
We assume that savings are invested within the country of origin. Hence,
the total amount of capital in the Home country in period t is equal to total
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savings in this country at time t− 1, so capital market equilibrium is given by:
KC(t) +KI(t) = Λ(t− 1)s(t− 1)/p(t− 1) (19)
and equivalent for the Foreign country.
Finally, the labour market clears if
LC(t) + LI(t) = Λ(t) (20)
Defining λ(t) ≡ LI(t)Λ(t) as the share of the labour force in the Home country
working in the investment good sector, this indicates the degree of specialization
within the country in the production of investment goods. Using equations (3-
8),(15), (16), (19) and (20), equilibrium in the capital market (19) can be written
as:
λ(t) = A(t)z(t)−B (21)
where A(t) ≡ 1−ββ−α 1−α2+ρ Λ(t−1)Λ(t) β(1 − τ) > 0, B ≡ 1−ββ−α [ (1+ρ)(1−α)τ2+ρ + α] > 0 and
z(t) ≡ kI(t−1)βkI(t) . A similar equation holds for the Foreign country.4
Substituting expressions (9), (10) and (20) into (18) we get the following
condition for equilibrium in the market for investment goods:
z(t)[Φ(t− 1)λ(t− 1) + λ˜(t− 1)] =
1
(1− α)β
{
α(1− β)[Φ(t) + 1] + (β − α)[Φ(t)λ(t) + λ˜(t)]
}
(22)
where Φ(t) ≡ Λ(t)/Λ˜(t) is the relative population size of the Home country.
Inserting equation (21) and its Foreign counterpart in (22) gives a non-linear
first-order difference equation in z(t), which is unstable (as shown in Appendix
1). This difference equation forms the basis of the numerical simulations of the
demographic shock presented in Section 4. In the next section the steady state
of this system will be discussed.
4Note that z = z˜.
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4 The steady state
In steady state, the equilibrium condition for the capital market (equation (21))
can be rewritten as:5
λ = Akβ−1I −B. (23)
It should be noted that A < (>)A˜ and B > (<)B˜ if τ > (<)τ˜ . Furthermore,
the capital-labour ratio in the investment good sector is equal in both countries
(kI = k˜I), which implies that
λ(t) =
1− τ
1− τ˜ λ˜(t) + B˜
1− τ
1− τ˜ −B. (24)
Equation (23) is represented graphically as the curve indicated “Capital
market equilibrium (H)” in Figure 3. Equation (24) is shown as the line called
“Capital market equilibrium (F)”.
The downward-sloping relation between the capital-labour ratio in the in-
vestment good sector (kI) and λ can be interpreted as follows. A higher
fraction of people working in the investment good sector has two effects on
the capital labour ratio of that sector. First, more people working in the
investment goods sector directly reduces kI for a given capital stock. Sec-
ond, for a given capital-labour ratio, total capital per worker rises if λ in-
creases. This immediately follows from equation (19) that can be written as:
KI+Kc
Λ = λkI + (1−λ)kc = [1 + (1−κ)λ]kI and the fact that κ < 1 because the
investment good sector is relatively capital intensive. More capital per worker
will increase wages and thereby savings and capital accumulation, but less than
proportionally. As the first effect dominates, the curve is downward sloping. A
higher PAYG tax in the home country reduces savings and implies less capital
accumulation, so for a given λ, kI will be lower. It also immediately follows that
the relative share of the investment good sector in the Home country is smaller
(larger) than in the Foreign country if the Home country has a larger (smaller)
PAYG pension scheme.
In order to determine the value of λ in the steady state, we also have to
use the condition for equilibrium in the market for investment goods (equation
(18)). Substituting the production functions and equation (10) into equation
(18), and using the fact that the capital-labour ratio in the investment good
5We indicate steady-state values by omitting the time index of a variable.
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sector in both countries is equal, we find that:
λ =
α(1− β)
((1− α)βkβ−1 − β + α)
Φ + 1
(Φ + (A˜/A))
− (1− τ)B˜ − (1− τ˜)B
Φ(1− τ) + (1− τ˜) . (25)
This curve is presented in Figure 3, indicated as “Investment goods market
equilibrium”. It has a straightforward interpretation: an increasing capital-
labour ratio affects production in both sectors. But, in the capital intensive
sector productivity of labour grows more, which attracts labour to this sector.
This results in a positive relation between λ and kI .
The intersection of both curves in the left-hand panel of Figure 3 determines
the steady-state values of λ and kI .
6 Given the value of λ, the value of λ˜ can
subsequently be determined from the right-hand panel of the figure.
The effect of an extension of the PAYG scheme in one of the countries is
shown in Figure 3. In the initial situation (E0 and Q0) the countries have the
same size of unfunded pension schemes. Keeping τ˜ constant and increasing τ ,
agents in the Home country get a weaker incentive to save, hence, the amount of
capital in the country decreases. As a result, the Home country specializes in the
production of labour intensive goods (λ falls), as indicated by the movement to
point E1. The decline in λ is very intuitive: higher PAYG contributions reduces
savings and the amount of capital in the Home country; therefore, the share of
agents working in the capital intensive sector declines. Moreover, the decline in
the amount of capital in the economy reduces capital-labour ratio in the capital
intensive sector.
The Foreign country is affected as well. First, it has a comparative advantage
in the production of capital intensive goods, which creates incentives for the
Foreign country to specialize in capital intensive goods. Second, the world
demand for capital falls when τ grows, this negatively affects the share of labour
in the capital intensive sector in both countries. The overall effect on λ˜ is not
clear, as it depends on the exact parameter values: if the slope of the capital-
market equilibrium line after the change of τ is still rather steep, λ˜ may even
decrease. Anyway, the share of the investment goods sector in the Home country
becomes smaller relative to the Foreign country.
It should also be pointed out, that a further increase in τ shifts the curves in
the left panel of Figure 3 even more down, so if the difference between τ and τ˜
gets sufficiently large, the intersection of the curves will be below the horizontal
6The analytical solution for the steady state is presented in Appendix 1.
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Figure 3: Change of steady state when τ increases
axis, resulting in a corner solution in which the Home country produces labour
intensive goods only.
This result coincides with what one would expect in a static HOS-model:
the country with a large PAYG scheme has low savings, so capital is relatively
scarce and labour relatively abundant. However, it is not completely clear if
specialization of countries necessarily leads to international trade. The Home
country produces less capital, but it also needs less capital. So the graphs do not
provide an answer to the question whether specialization within the countries
intensifies international trade.
5 An asymmetric decrease in fertility
In this section we study the long-run and short-run effects of a negative demo-
graphic shock occurring in one country at period t = 1. The timing is as follows.
At time t = 1 population growth in the Home country is temporarily lower than
in the Foreign country, leading to a relatively smaller labour force in the Home
country, so Φ ≡ Λ/Λ˜ decreases. This can be interpreted as one country ageing
relative to the other. This demographic shock is not foreseen in period t = 0
at the moment that agents choose a sector to work, but they do take it into
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account when subsequently making their saving/consumption decisions.7 In the
following periods, the population in both countries grows at the original rate
again, so the relative size of the country will not change further and Φ will
remain at the lower level. If instead of the temporal difference in fertilities we
assume a permanent one, one country would become infinitely small compared
with another, and the model would reduce to the one-country case in the long
run.
5.1 Long-run effects
The long-run effects of a negative demographic shock in the Home country are
summarised in the following proposition:
Proposition 1. Suppose that τ+ τ˜ < 1 and α > 0.25. A decrease in the relative
size of the Home country’s population:
- increases the capital-labour ratio in both sectors and decreases the share of
labour employed in the investment good sector in both countries if τ > τ˜ .
- decreases the capital-labour ratio in both sectors and increases the share of
labour employed in the investment good sector in both countries if τ < τ˜ .
- does not affect the capital-labour ratio and the relative degree of special-
ization if τ = τ˜ .
Proof. The proof is in Appendix 2.
In case τ > τ˜ , agents in the Home country save less than agents in the
Foreign country. So decreasing the relative size of the Home country leads to an
increase of the average amount of savings per worker in the union as a whole,
which drives the capital-labour ratios up. If τ < τ˜ , agents in the Home country
save more than agents in the Foreign country, so if their number decreases,
capital-labour ratios in the union will decrease.
This result can also be represented graphically. The decrease in the relative
size of the Home country shifts the curve representing equilibrium in the market
for investment goods down if the Home country has a relatively large PAYG
scheme (see Figure 4), and up if this country has a relatively small PAYG
7We made this assumption because the choice in which sector to work often requires a
specific education or skills training, which is usually obtained before entering the labour
market. However, the saving-consumption decision is usually made during the working period
when more information about future developments can be taken into account.
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Figure 4: Change of steady state when Λ decreases in case τ > τ˜
scheme. As the line and curve representing capital market equilibrium are not
affected, the result for the capital-labour ratio in the investment good sector and
the share of labour employed in this sector immediately follows. According to
equations (9) and (10), the capital-labour ratio in the consumption good sector
moves in the same direction as kI .
The right-hand panel of Figure 4 shows that λ and λ˜ move in the same
direction. If τ > τ˜ , the asymmetric demographic shock in the Home country
causes the Foreign country to move away from the point of full specialization in
investment goods. At the same time, if Λ decreases very strongly, a corner so-
lution may result where the Home country is fully specialized in the production
of consumption goods and imports all investment goods. This is opposite to
the prediction of the HOS model without endogenous capital accumulation that
a decrease in the labour force in the Home country will lead to more special-
ization in the production of capital intensive goods. The difference comes from
including pension systems, which determine savings and, hence, the comparative
advantage of the country in capital/labour intensive goods production. Indeed,
according to the standard HOS theorem the relative abundance and scarcity of
production factors determines the specialization pattern of a country; therefore,
if there is no endogenous capital accumulation, one may expect that a decline in
the labour force in one of the countries will make it labour abundant. However,
in the long run, the amount of capital adjusts in the model, leading to a change
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in abundance and scarcity of production factors, which depends on the size of
PAYG contributions.
This result follows from the fact that if τ > τ˜ , the Home country specialises
in labour intensive goods and the Foreign country in capital intensive goods. A
decline in Λ increases the average world per capita savings, implying relatively
more capital and less labour. Without a change in the allocation of labour
between the two production sectors, this would make labour intensive goods
relatively scarce, and capital intensive goods abundant. At the same time, the
demand for both goods increases in per capita terms because income per capita
rises due to a higher capital-labour ratio. Consequently, labour will move to the
sector producing the labour-intensive good, resulting in further specialization
in the Home country and spillover effects to the Foreign country.
In the case that τ < τ˜ , the opposite result holds: the negative demographic
shock in the Home country leads to higher shares of the labour force working in
the investment goods sector. The Foreign country moves away from the point
of full specialization in labour intensive consumption goods. For the Home
country it holds that if the value of λ increases very strongly, it may eventually
be completely specialized in the production of capital intensive goods.
5.2 Short-run effects
In this subsection, we discuss the short-run effects of a temporary decrease in
fertility in the Home country. That is, the relative size of the Home country
decreases once and for all at time t = 1. The short-run effects will be demon-
strated with numerical simulations in this section, a more technical discussion
can be found in Appendix 1.
5.2.1 Calibration
The capital share for a one-sector model is usually estimated to be around 0.3.
For example, Howarth (1998) assumes a share of capital income equal to 0.25,
Bouzahzah et al. (2002) set it at 0.29, Kydland and Prescott (1982) choose
a value of 0.36. In line with this, we chose a value that is a bit above these
estimates for the capital intensive sector and a value just below these values
for the labour intensive sector, i.e., α = 0.2 and β = 0.4. As the period in the
model is approximately equal to 35 years, the discount rate ρ is set at 0.42,
which approximately corresponds to the 1% annual discount rate that is widely
used in the literature (see for example Jermann (1998) and Bo¨rsch-Supan et al.
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(2006)). The tax rate is set at 0.25 for the country with the relatively small
PAYG scheme and to 0.3 in the other country.8 Initially, the population size in
both countries is equal: Λ = Λ˜ = 1. At time t = 1 the population in the Home
country decreases to a level that is permanently 5% lower (i.e., from Λ = 1 to
Λ = 0.95).
The dynamics of this model are summarised by a first-order difference equa-
tion in z(t) ≡ kI(t − 1)β/kI(t) with time-dependent coefficients. As shown in
the Appendix, this difference equation is unstable.9
5.2.2 Simulation results
Figure 5 presents the time path of λ both for the case that τ < τ˜ and for τ > τ˜ .
First consider the case that τ < τ˜ . At t = 1 λ increases in both cases, which
corresponds to the result of the static HOS model. Note that with a larger
demographic shock this increase may lead to a corner solution where one of
the countries completely specializes in one of the goods. Next period, λ jumps
to its new steady state value. If τ < τ˜ this new steady state value is slightly
larger and if τ > τ˜ it is smaller than the value in the old steady state. In the
latter case, the long-run result is opposite to the prediction of the HOS model
without an endogenous capital accumulation: the Home country specializes in
the production of labour intensive goods, and a negative demographic shock
in this country makes it specialize even more in the production of this type of
goods.
Figure 6 presents the time path of the capital-labour ratio in the investment
good sector. As the amount of investment goods produced in period t = 0
cannot be changed any more when it becomes known that the population in
the Home country will shrink in period t = 1, capital is abundant at t = 1.
That is, the capital-labour ratios in both sectors and both countries at t = 1
are high. Since the low interest rate is already anticipated at t = 0, savings and
thus the demand for investment goods change at t = 0 in both countries. A
lower interest rate, and higher wages, affect agents in both countries.10 In the
8In fact, qualitatively the results are not sensitive to the absolute values of PAYG tax
rates, but it is important that the two countries have different rates.
9Note that z is a non-predetermined variable, as kI(t) depends on LI(t), which is non-
predetermined.
10The presence of a PAYG pension scheme causes savings to decrease when the interest
rate decreases and future wages are higher. Given that we have assumed a logarithmic utility
function, the income effect and the substitution effect of a change in the interest rate on
savings would exactly cancel out if there was no PAYG scheme. This does not hold with a
more general utility function as well as in our model due to the presence of a PAYG scheme.
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Figure 5: Share of labour in sector I of country H
Figure 6: Capital-labour ratio in sector I
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Home country, this is counteracted by the decrease in pension benefits due to
the negative demographic shock at t = 1, which raises savings at t = 0 in that
country. For the given parameter values, the negative effect via interest rate
and wages dominates when τ < τ˜ , implying that the demand for investment
goods falls, leading to a decrease in the relative price of these goods already at
t = 0 (see Figure 7).
The abundance of capital at t = 1 stimulates production in both sectors,
but more in the capital intensive investment good sector. Furthermore, workers
move from the consumption good sector to the investment good sector. Thus,
the production of investment goods will be relatively high at t = 1 leading to a
fall in the price of investment goods that is even lower than at t = 0.
The high supply of investment goods in period t = 1 affects capital-labour
ratios in the subsequent periods that are lower than at t = 1 but still above
the new steady-state value. The abundance of capital leads to the same effects
as at t = 1, but the size of the effects is smaller. This development continues,
leading to a gradual decrease in the capital-labour ratios along with a gradual
increase in the price of investment goods. As discussed above, in the long run,
this results in a capital-labour ratio that is below the initial steady-state value
and a price of investment goods that is higher than it initially was.
In case the Home country has a relatively large PAYG scheme, the short-run
results are analogous to the ones presented above, the only difference being that
in that case, the interest-rate effect on savings at t = 0 is dominated by the
effect of the decrease in the PAYG benefit due to the demographic shock, so
that the relative price of investment goods slightly rises at that time.
Figure 8 shows the effect of the demographic shock on international trade. It
presents the difference between the amount of investment goods produced in
country H and the actual amount of savings in country H in that period. This
difference is equal to the amount of investment goods sold to (bought from)
country F, if the value is positive (negative). The demographic shock at t =
1 leads to a relatively higher demand for capital goods in country H at t =
0 compared to country F, because pension benefits in country H are directly
affected by the demographic shock. This leads to a smaller export of investment
goods from the Home country when τ < τ˜ , or a larger import if τ > τ˜ at
t = 0. At t = 1 there is relatively more capital in the country affected by the
demographic shock, so it starts exporting more capital (or importing less). At
later stages the volume of trade decreases in both cases compared to their initial
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Figure 7: Price of capital
equilibrium, because of a smaller total number of agents in the world.
Figures 9 and 10 show the effect on lifetime utility of the generations in both
sectors and countries when τ > τ˜ . As the case τ < τ˜ is very similar, we omit
it. The time on the horizontal axis corresponds to the period of birth of a
generation. The increase in the price of investment goods at t = 0 leads to
higher wages in that sector and hence positively affects the PAYG benefits of
the generation born at t = −1. Furthermore, the higher price increases the
interest rates in the investment good sector at t = 0 and thus the return on
savings of generation t − 1. These effects are the same in both sectors and
both countries. However, they are very small. So, the utility of generation
t = −1 slightly increases. At t = 1 the number of agents in the world is smaller
and capital is abundant, which drives interest rates down. Smaller interest
rates imply a lower return to savings for the generation born at t = 0 in both
countries. In the Home country, the decrease in the PAYG benefit caused by
the rise in the dependency ratio adds an additional negative effect on utility
of this generation. Finally, the members of this generation that work in the
investment good sector experience a (small) positive effect as the increase in
the price of the investment good at t = 0 implies a higher wage when young.
Note that this is the only generation for which the effects of the shock differ for
workers in different sectors. All subsequent generations can take the effects of
the shock into account when deciding in which sector to work. Hence, for these
generations utility for workers in both sectors must be equal.
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Figure 8: Net exports of investment goods by the Home country (total volume)
Figure 9: Utility in the Home country when τ > τ˜
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Figure 10: Utility in the Foreign country when τ > τ˜
The generation born at t = 1 enjoys the large capital stock that results
from the investment of their parents, so their utility is affected positively. In
subsequent periods, the capital-labour ratio gradually decreases and the same
holds for utility. Initially, it is much larger than in the original steady state; in
the long run, it decreases but will still be above that level. This time pattern
is the same for both countries. However, absolute utility levels differ due to the
difference in the size of the PAYG scheme between the countries. Without such
difference, there would be no long-run effects of a temporary demographic shock.
Furthermore, these differences also imply that the effects of the shock in one
country spill over to the other country: as the economy is dynamically efficient,
the Foreign country (which has the smallest PAYG scheme in this example) has
highest utility. The opposite holds if τ < τ˜ .
6 Conclusions
This paper analysed the effects of demographic shocks in a discrete time dynamic
model with two countries, two sectors, two-period overlapping generations and
PAYG pensions. We showed that in the long run, the relative size of the sectors
in both countries (and therefore the pattern of trade) depends on the relative size
of the PAYG schemes in the countries. A smaller PAYG pension scheme leads
to higher savings, which gives a country a comparative advantage in the pro-
duction of capital intensive goods, leading to specialization in these goods. The
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other country specializes in labour intensive goods. We also showed that, while
the short-run effects of demographic shocks are not affected by the presence of
PAYG schemes and coincide with the predictions of the classical HOS-model,
the long-run effects can be different. Due to the fact that PAYG pensions af-
fect the incentive to save and accumulate capital, the long-run consequences of
demographic shocks in the dynamic model with unfunded pensions may be op-
posite to the predictions of the partial-equilibrium classical HOS model without
endogenous capital accumulation. So, a temporal decrease in fertility leads to
specialization of the country in capital intensive goods in the short run, but in
the long run, specialization of the countries depends on the relative size of the
PAYG scheme. Comparable results are likely to hold in the presence of other
factors that affect the desire or ability to accumulate capital like, for example,
differences in the rate of time preference and government debt.
The current setup could be used as a basis for future research by adding
several extensions. In this paper, labour supply was assumed to be exogenous.
Allowing for endogenous labour supply could lead to a smaller size of the labour
force, making capital the relatively abundant factor, if the PAYG scheme is ex-
tended. Furthermore, the PAYG scheme could be designed as a defined-benefit
scheme, where the contribution rate is endogenously determined to balance the
government budget. This will not affect the long-run results we found in this pa-
per, but it can affect the short-run transitional dynamics if a higher contribution
rate, caused by an increase in the old-age dependency ratio, discourages private
savings. Finally, the size of the PAYG scheme itself could be considered to
be the outcome of a political decision-making process, and hence endogenously
determined through a voting process of members of currently living generations.
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Appendix 1: The dynamic system
To analyse the dynamics of the model, one can express the dynamic equation for
the fraction of agents working in the investment good sector. For this reason we
take z(t) from equation (21) and λ˜(t) from equation (24), after inserting them
in (22) we get:
λ(t)
[
λ(t− 1)
(
Φ(t− 1) + 1− τ˜
1− τ
)
+B
1− τ˜
1− τ − B˜ −
A(t)(β − α)
(1− α)β
(
Φ(t) +
1− τ˜
1− τ
)]
+Bλ(t− 1)(Φ(t− 1) + 1− τ˜
1− τ
)
+B
(
B
1− τ˜
1− τ − B˜
)
=
A(t)
(1− α)β
[
α(1− β)(Φ(t) + 1) + (β − α)
(
B
1− τ˜
1− τ − B˜
)]
. (26)
From here, λ(t) can be expressed as:
λ(t) =
aλ(t− 1) + b
cλ(t− 1) + d , (27)
where
a = −B
(
Φ(t− 1) + 1− τ˜
1− τ
)
;
b =
A(t)
(1− α)β
[
α(1− β)(Φ(t) + 1) + (β − α)
(
B
1− τ˜
1− τ − B˜
)]
−B
(
B
1− τ˜
1− τ − B˜
)
;
c = Φ(t− 1) + 1− τ˜
1− τ ;
d = B
1− τ˜
1− τ − B˜ −
A(t)(β − α)
(1− α)β
(
Φ(t) +
1− τ˜
1− τ
)
.
This function is a hyperbola; a < 0 and c > 0. It is easy to note that if
λ(t−1) < −d/c, the denominator of equation (27) is negative. If λ(t−1) > −b/a,
the nominator is negative too. Furthermore, if λ(t− 1) = 0, λ(t) = b/d < 0 for
most reasonable parameter values.
In order to determine the shape of the hyperbola we shall find out whether
−b/a < −d/c or the opposite. Assume that: −b/a > −d/c, this equation is
equivalent to the following:
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A(t)
B(1− α)β
[
α(1− β)(Φ(t) + 1) + (β − α)
(
B
1− τ˜
1− τ − B˜
)]
>
A(t)(β − α)
(1− α)β
(
Φ(t) +
1− τ˜
1− τ
)
After further simplifying this expression, we get:
(1 + ρ)(1− α)(Φ(t)τ + τ˜)
2 + ρ
< 0. (28)
This is in contradiction to the assumptions about the parameter values;
therefore −b/a < −d/c.
Figure (11) presents a schematic portrait of the dynamic equation if b/d < 0
and λ(t) is limited by reasonable values (λ(t) ∈ [0, 1]).11 It is easy to notice
that the equilibrium is unstable.
We assumed that initially the system is in its steady-state equilibrium. Fig-
ure 11 shows that there is a unique reasonable equilibrium point for λ. 12
Therefore, equation (21) gives a unique equilibrium value of z, resulting in a
unique value of k in equilibrium, and equation (10) gives a unique equilibrium
value of the price level p. Therefore, given the assumptions about the parameter
values, all variables of interest are uniquely determined.
Short-run effects of a demographic shock
Because difference equation (27) is unstable, we assume that after the demo-
graphic change, the system is again in the equilibrium with the incomplete
specialization: the value of λ jumps from one equilibrium to another.13 The
system should be in its new steady state at time t = 2 (when the coefficients
of the difference equation do not change any more), i.e. immediately after the
shock in period t = 1, otherwise it will never stabilise. Given that λ attains its
new steady-state value at t = 2, the value of this variable at the time of the
shock (t = 1) can easily be calculated using the difference equation. So λ goes
to the new steady-state in two steps. The same holds for z (see equation (21)).
11If b/d > 0, an internal solution does not exist, and the Home country completely specializes
in consumption goods. In general, the hyperbola can intersect the 450 line when λ(t− 1) > 1;
in this case, the country specializes in investment goods.
12In general, there is also an equilibrium point with λ < 0; however, it is meaningless.
13In general, the system may not necessarily be in the steady state, and then the system
diverges to a point of complete specialization. As the figure indicates, the transition path in
this case is also unique.
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Figure 11: Dynamics of λ(t)
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Given the initial value kI(0), the time path for kI can easily be derived from
z(1) and z(2). As z(t) = kβI (t−1)/kI(t), and k(t−1) is known from the previous
period, the value of kI(t) is unique. Note that the definition of z(t) implies that
the capital-labour ratio does not go to the new steady-state in two steps, but
jumps to a new value at t = 1 and then gradually converges to its new long-run
equilibrium. Equation (10) results in a unique price level. All other variables
can then easily be derived.
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Appendix 2: Proof of Proposition 1
In order to prove proposition 1, it is more convenient to derive another dynamic
equation for z(t) instead of using equation (26). Inserting equation (21) and its
Foreign counterpart in (22) gives a non-linear first-order difference equation in
z(t) ≡ kI(t−1)βkI(t) :
z(t)
{
Φ(t− 1)[A(t− 1)z(t− 1)−B] + A˜(t− 1)z(t− 1)− B˜
}
=
1
(1− α)β
{
α(1− β)[Φ(t) + 1] + (β − α)Φ(t)[A(t)z(t)−B] + (β − α)[A˜(t)z(t)− B˜]
}
. (29)
Note that z(t) is a non-predetermined variable, as it contains kI(t), which
depends on the non-predetermined variable LI(t).
The steady state
We first solve the steady state of this system. In the steady state, equation (29)
is equivalent to:
a˜z2 + b˜z + c˜ = 0, (30)
where
a˜ ≡ β(1− α)
(
Λ(1− τ) + Λ˜(1− τ˜))
β − α > 0 (31)
b˜ ≡ − (Λ + Λ˜)(β + α+ αρ) + (1 + ρ− αρ− β)(τΛ + τ˜ Λ˜)
β − α < 0 (32)
c˜ ≡ (1 + ρ)(τΛ + τ˜ Λ˜)
β
> 0. (33)
The solutions to this quadratic equation are:
z1 =
−b˜+
√
b˜2 − 4a˜c˜
2a˜
. (34)
z2 =
−b˜−
√
b˜2 − 4a˜c˜
2a˜
. (35)
Proof. Consider the long-run effects of Λ on the equilibrium point kI . As kI is
a strictly decreasing function of z1 described by equation (34), the sign of the
derivative of kI with respect to Λ is the negative of the sign of the derivative of
z1 with respect to Λ at the point Λ = Λ˜, which is for simplicity set to 1.
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∂z1
∂Λ
= − ∂b˜
∂Λ
1
2a˜
+
1
2a˜
√
b˜2 − 4a˜c˜
(
b˜
∂b˜
∂Λ
− 2c˜ ∂a˜
∂Λ
− 2a˜ ∂c˜
∂Λ
)
− z1
a˜
∂a˜
∂Λ
(36)
The derivatives ∂a˜/∂Λ, ∂b˜/∂Λ, ∂c˜/∂Λ can be easily found from equations
(31)-(33). Substituting a˜, b˜, c˜, their partial derivatives and z into equation (36)
and making a number of algebraical manipulations the expression simplifies to:
∂z1
∂Λ
= −z21Ω(τ˜ − τ) (37)
where
Ω =
1
2(β − α)(τ + τ˜)
(
β + αρ+ α+
1
(β − α)
√
b˜2 − 4a˜c˜
(
2β2 + 2α2 + 2α2ρ2 + 4αβ + 4α2ρ+ 4βαρ+
(τ + τ˜)(−β − β2 − 2α2 + 3α− ρβ + ρ2α− α2ρ2 − 3α2ρ+ αβ + 4αρ)
))
A sufficient condition for Ω to be positive is τ + τ˜ < 1 and α > 0.25.
Despite the proposition is formulated and proved for τ + τ˜ < 1 and α >
0.25, the set of parameters for which the proposition is valid, is much larger.
Numerically, with the same two-step L-BFGS-B algorithm as in Appendix 1,
we checked that for parameter values 0 < α < β < 1, ρ > 0, 0 < τ + τ˜ < 2,
Ω can get nonnegative values only. Hence, from (37), the sign of ∂kI/∂Λ in
equilibrium depends on the sign of τ˜ − τ : if τ < τ˜ , the dependence is positive.
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